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Abstract
We attempt in this paper to estimate the impact of the endowment of natural resources,
particularly oil rent, as well as the impact of the quality of institutions, on the level of public
spending in Algeria. Our purpose is to test, by the application of an econometric estimation
(OLS and 2SLS), the significance of the variable oil rent and the variables indicating the
institutional quality of public expenditure management. Moreover, it was interesting to add
the interaction term between rent and the variables indicating the quality of the institutions to
see the indirect and common effect on the dependent variable.
The results of the estimation show that the impact of natural rent is greater than the impact of
oil rent on both components of public spending: equipment expenses and operational
expenses. Thus, we see that there is no proportional relationship between rent and public
spending. In regards of the institutional quality, the results show that the budgetary
procedures lack transparency with the presence of rent, because the benefits related to the
exercise of power are more important, which encourage politicians to manipulate the
composition of public expenditure to maximize their likelihood to make decisions. This result
is argued by the positive relation between spending and respectively the level of financial risk,
and the level of economic risk. Positive relationship between public spending and the measure
of political risk shows that the current government increases spending to avoid conflicts and
manifestations of the population. However, the interaction effect between rent and
institutional quality measures on spending is negative, indicating that the presence of rent in
less democrat countries like Algeria increases expenditure. This indicates that the positive
public spending effects diminish as institutional quality improves.
Keywords: Natural Resources, Oil rent, Public spending, Institutional Quality.
JEL codes : C01, E02, H5
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Introduction
Many countries are counted among the most endowed in terms of natural
resources, oil and gas are the most significant examples. Nevertheless, it is necessary
to insure a good management of this wealth so that the wealth constitutes a vector of
growth and economic development.
Algeria is among the dependent countries in natural resources where the oil tax
system occupies an important place in all government revenues. However, following
the oil crisis of 1998, when the price of a barrel reached eighteen (18) dollars, the
government made the decision in 2000 to establish a Revenue Regulation Fund (FRR)
(Barka, 2009) in the form of an account of special affectation, with the aim to protect
public spending from the negative effects of volatility and unpredictability in oil prices
in international markets.

What is the impact of the endowment in natural resources and the quality of
institutions on the management of the public spending in Algeria?
To answer this question, we use an econometric study inspired by the works of
Rabah Arezki and Thorvaldur Gylfason (2011), and Louis-Marie Philippot (2008). We
show the degree of significance of the relationship between total rent, oil rent, quality
of institutions, and the components of public spending. We start with a brief review of
the literature on a subject of the study. Then we present an empirical analysis which
includes a description of the variables used and the econometric model. After, we
present the results and our comments. Finally, we feature the conclusion and future
prospects of the study.
1- Literature
There are numerous studies which have examined the relationship between
resource rent, quality of institutions, growth and public spending. Starting with the
literature on natural resources and its impact on the economic growth, we look to
Frederik Van der Ploeg (2010) and his paper " Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?"
He identifies a variety of hypotheses and elements of proofs on the dependence of
natural resources. At first, he presented the hypotheses supporting the appreciation of
the real exchange rate according to important volumes of natural resources,
deindustrialization, and bad growth perspectives. He considered that these effects are
most recurrent in countries characterized by bad institutional quality, the absence of
law, corruption, presidential democracies, and undeveloped financial systems.
On the other hand, the author exposed the assumptions assuming the presence
of resources enhances "rent seeking" and is accompanied by bad quality of institutions,
thus leading to corruption in non-democratic countries. Dutch disease and
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deindustrialization are among the explanations (Corden & Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984)
of the resource curse. In fact, wealth due to the export of natural resources leads to an
appreciation of the real exchange rate, resulting in the contraction of the commercial
sector (Neary & Corden, 1982; Corden, 1984). This illustrates, along with the SalterSwan (1959-1960) model of two-sector economy, a resource windfall: abstracting from
capital accumulation, international investment, and financial assets. Moreover, SalterSwan developed for small economies a dependent or Scandinavian economic model,
(Salter, 1959; Swan 1960; Aukrust 1960). The supply of non-tradable goods is positively
related to the real exchange rate. Indeed, a real depreciation of the domestic currency
stimulates an increased supply of tradable goods (via improved price competitiveness)
to the detriment of the supply of non-tradable goods.
In addition, Van der Ploeg cited some empirical studies on the Dutch disease
effects. The most important is the pioneering study by Sachs and Warner (1995), which
explains the average real GDP growth per capita over the period 1970-1990 because of
natural resources. This study shows that there is a significant negative effect of
resource dependence (measured by the share of primary exports of GNP in 1970) on
growth.
In another study about the relationship between natural resource rents,
democracy and growth, Paul Callier and Anke Hoeffler (2007), started with a simple
model of democratic politics in which they distinguish two dimensions of democracy:
electoral competition and control. The authors used in the regression analysis eight
sub-periods: 1970-1973, 1974-1977... 1998-2001. They successfully build a panel of 969
observations. The results show that in developing countries, the combination of rent
and the low level of democracy have negatively affected growth.
The work of Rabah Arezki and Thorvaldur Gylfason (2011) examined the effect of
the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption and internal
conflict, presenting an empirical study with an econometric approach based on the
dynamic panel data on a sample of 29 countries in sub-Saharan Africa over the period
1985-2007. The results suggest that good political institutions by limiting the power of
executives diminished the negative effect of resource rents on corruption. On the other
hand, the weakness of the political institutions increases the impact of resource rents
on corruption. In parallel, the increase in resource rent leads to more (less) government
spending in countries that are less (more) democratic. The term of interaction between
resource rents and Polity2 (democracy) score on corruption is significant and
quantitatively important. In general, the results show that the mechanisms by which
the rent resources influence the corruption cannot be separated from political systems.
Concerning institutional quality, the economic historians such as North and
Thomas (1973) provided the first accounts of their critical role. But what do we mean
by institutions? According to Douglas North (1990), institutions are the game rules in
a society or more formally, the humanly designed constraints that share human
interaction. They structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or
economic. However, legal institutions as a subset of the overall institutional
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framework can be defined as the rules that govern trade relations between the different
agents of society, businesses, households and government (Beck 2010).
Many economic studies in recent years suggest that institutions are necessary for
economic development and growth. Indeed, in societies with institutions that are
qualified bad in terms of management, politicians adopt unsustainable policies to
satisfy different groups and stay in power (Acemoglu et al. 2002). Discovering later
what are the measures of institutional quality, we distinguish the indicators of the
governance of corruption, bureaucracy, rights and orders (Matthias Busse and Steffen
Groning (2011). Other measures outlined in a study by Daniel Kaufman, Art and Pablo
Kaay-Zoid Lobation 1999 are i.) the overall index of governance which is an average
calculated based on six variables; namely 1) citizen participation and accountability possibility for citizens to choose their leaders, to enjoy civil and political rights and to
have an independent press; 2) political stability and absence of violence - the
probability that a state will not be overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means;
(3) effectiveness of public authorities - quality of public service delivery and
competence and political independence of the public service; 4) regulatory burdens relative lack of state regulation of product markets, the banking system and foreign
trade; (5) rule of law - protection of persons and property against violence and theft,
independence and efficiency of the judiciary and respect for contracts; 6) absence of
corruption - no abuse of power for the benefit of private interests, (ii) property rights,
and (iii) control of the executive power.
These measures themselves are not objective; they are subjective assessments and
assessments of national experts or population assessments in surveys carried out by
international organizations and non-governmental organizations.
Natural resources would prevent the development of "good" institutions
conducive to economic development. If institutions are a factor of economic
development, it is important to understand the determinants of institutional quality.
A number of studies have been carried out (La Porta et al., 1998; Chong & Zonforlin,
2000; Islam & Montenegro, 2002; Rigobon & Rodrik, 2004; Siba, 2008) A number of
important variables such as income, latitude, ethnic fragmentation, religious
affiliation, openness, inequality, schooling or legal origin are mentioned. These
variables are used later as instruments for the explanation of the institutions.
About the public spending and resource rents, Louis-Marie Philippot in 2008,
examined in a working paper the relationship between natural rent and composition
of public spending, by maintaining the arguments of the politico-budgetary cycle
model Drazen and Eslava (2005a). He estimated a fixed effects model in order to
explain the part of a category of expenditure in total public spending by number of
variables, rent, and other control variables. The results show that the presence of rent
is associated with an increase in current expenditures including subsidies. However,
the existence of natural rent has no significant impact on the share of capital
expenditure.
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2- Rent, Institutional Quality and Public Spending in Algeria: An Empirical
Analysis
2.1. Description of the Variables:
In this study the dependent variables are both components of public spending:
equipment spending and operational expenses. The data relative to these two variables
arise from bases compiled by the head office (executive management) of the Algerian
Treasury (Ministry of Finance). We use logarithms to simplify the data.
Since the work of Sachs and Warner (1995), natural endowment is generally
measured by primary exports in total exports or as a percentage of GDP. This indicator
tends to measure the effect of concentration of exports, more than the effect of natural
resources (Brunnschweiler, 2008). Here we use the measure of the natural wealth of a
country, "the natural rent" compiled by the World Bank (World Development
Indicators), as well as the measure of oil exports(OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin
2016).
We therefore use three different measures between natural rent, oil rent and oil
exports from World Development Indicators (WDI) 17 February, 2016 and OPEC
Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016:
Table 1: Independent Variables; Measures of Rent
Variable

Definition

Data Source

Rent (% GDP)

Total Naturel Rent is the sum of oil rents,
natural gas rents, coal rents, minerals rents and
forest rents.
Rents = natural resource price – extraction
costs
Oil rent

World Development
Indicators (WDI) 17
February, 2016

Oil rent
(%GDP)
Log oil_export

Oil exportation

World Development
Indicators (WDI) 17
February, 2016
OPEC Annual
Statistical Bulletin 2016

Source: Developed by the authors

In addition, we use to measure institutional quality, three variables compiled by
using data from the ICRG (International Country Risk Guide), which in total contains
22 variables in three set of categories: political, economic, and financial risk, starting in
1984. These data have been extensively used in the literature on the effects of
institutions and, in particular they are the data underling the composite measure of
« Institutional Quality » used in Mehlum et al 2006 and Boschini et al 2007. Moreover,
the methodology of ICRG is regularly used by researchers of the IMF (International
Monetary Fund).
We are essentially interested in the three measures: economic risk rating, financial
risk rating that refers to the role of law and legal institutions (Beck,2010) and political
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risk rating with respect to the rules and the level of democracy (Busse & Groning 2011)
as well as Kaufman, et. al. (1999). These variables are presented with a score from 0 to
100.
The choice of these variables is argued by the compatibility of the data with the
use of other variables in other case studies of Algeria. These three measures are
presented as follows:
Table 2: Institutional Quality Measures
Variables
Definition
E risk
All the risks of origins associated with the
economic activity of companies. The risks can
include external risks to a company such as the
political risk, or risk of inflation, but also risks
specific to the company such as operational risk.
F risk
The risk of losing money due to financial
transactions (financial assets) or economic
transactions with financial implications such as
currency risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk ... etc.
P risk
Entails the risk of emergence of conflicts, terrorism,
respect for the rule of law and regulatory and
commercial environments.

Data Source
ICRG (International
Country Risk Guide)

ICRG (International
Country Risk Guide)

ICRG (International
Country Risk Guide)

Source: Developed by the authors.

In our econometric study, we introduced a control vector of variables X. These
control variables are presented as follows:
Table 3: Control Variables
Variable
Definition
TI (% GDP)
Expressed as a ratio of total investment in current
local currency over GDP. Investment or gross
capital formation is measured by the total value
of gross fixed capital formation, and changes in
inventories and acquisitions less disposals of
valuables for a unit or sector. [SNA 1993]
GNS (%GDP)
Expressed as a ratio of gross national savings in
current local currency and GDP in current local
currency. Gross national saving is gross
disposable income less final consumption
expenditure after taking account an adjustment
for pension funds [SNA 1993]. For many
countries, the estimates of national saving are
built up from national accounts data on gross
domestic investment and from balances of
payments-based data on net foreign investment.
Import Bs et S
The volume of imports of goods and services to
(% of GDP)
GDP.
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Source: Developed by the authors.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Obs

LDE

5.761409

5.774334

7.821619

3.644666

1.500577

31

LDF

6.506523

6.752492

8.472747

3.957188

1.412602

31

OIL_EXPO

8.251196

8.226088

8.660415

7.942504

0.212133

31

OIL_RENT

18.19504

16.93440

31.90631

6.740223

6.961649

31

PRISK

54.20696

56.08333

64.25000

41.42000

7.404375

31

PRIX_BARIL

53.55930

38.46318

117.2294

18.48974

30.65020

31

RESERVE

10.03402

10.05362

10.08884

9.932677

0.055861

31

GNS

36.85158

34.53300

57.49400

20.16800

11.47309

31

IMP_BS_ET_S

25.69919

24.90000

36.00000

18.40000

3.831824

31

E_RISK

34.76667

35.25000

45.08000

25.75000

6.819384

31

F_RISK

38.13723

36.67000

49.00000

23.58000

9.011400

31

TI

32.03684

29.83700

49.05100

22.44000

7.624670

31

TEMP
23.84845
24.15000
Source: Elaborated by the authors.

25.00104

21.75417

0.920435

31

2.2.

Maximum Minimum

Econometric Model and Methodology

The study focuses on the case of Algeria which is among the most endowed
countries with natural resources, and is where oil taxation has an important place in
all government revenues. With regard to the period of analysis we are constrained by
the availability of data on institutional quality, so we work over the period 1985-2015.
We proceed to econometric estimation to test the significance of the variables
used. The model takes the following forms:

𝒅𝒑𝒕 = ∝ +𝜷𝟏 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑸𝑰𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑿𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕 …. (1)
𝒅𝒑𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑸𝑰𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑿𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒 (𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 ∗ 𝑸𝑰𝒕 ) + 𝜺𝒕 … (2)
The variable dpt is the share of the various components of public spending. Our
variable of interest is the total natural rent, the oil rent and the oil export. 𝑸𝑰𝒕 is the
quality of institutions measured by three variables: economic risk, financial risk and
political risk. X is the vector of control variables, and (rent*QI) is the term of
interaction.
2.3.

OLS Results:

For each category of expenditure, we estimate three models by integrating in turn
the different variables of interest: rent measures and institutional quality (see the tables
of results).
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Table 5: Equipment Spending, Institutional Quality and Rent
Variables
rente
E risk

Model
(1)
0.04
(0.02)*
0.04
(0.021)*

F risk

Model
(2)
0.004
(0.015)

Model
(3)
0.05
(0.02)*

Model
(1)
0.067
(0.03)
0.06
(0.02)*

F risk

0.13
(0.019)*

Impor Bs et
S

0.13
(0.021)*
0.004
(0.022)
-0.05
(0.02)

0.05
(0.018)*
0.001
(0.014)
-0.043
(0.016)*

-0.018
(0.01)
0.11
(0.02)*
0.02
(0.023)
0.016
(0.037)

R2 Ajusted

0.90

0.95

0.89

GNS

Oil rent
E risk

P risk
TI

Variables

Model
(2)
-0.01
(0.02)

0.13
(0.017)*

P risk
TI
GNS
Impor Bs
et S
R2
Ajusted

Model
(3)
0.03
(0.04)

0.10
(0.02)*
-0.0003
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.02)

0.05
(0.01)*
0.010
(0.013)
-0.04
(0.01)*

-0.02
(0.01)*
0.09
(0.027)*
0.06
(0.023)*
0.039
(0.04)

0.90

0.95

0.87

With (*) to indicate the significance of variables at the 5% level. In parentheses, we give the standard
deviations. Source: Developed by the authors.

Table 6: Operational Expenditure, Institutional Quality, and Rent
Variables
Rent
E risk

Model
(1)
0.06
(0.05)
0.11
(0.02)*

F risk

Model
(2)
-0.06
(0.03)

GNS
Impor Bs
et S
R2
Ajusted

Oil rent

-0.005
(0.024)
-0.008
(0.02)
0.007
(0.026)
0.90

Model
(1)
0.048
(0.03)
0.08
(0.02)*

F risk

0.20
(0.02)*

0.08
(0.03)*
-0.03
(0.035)
0.001
(0.04)
0.77

Variables

E risk

P risk
TI

Model
(3)
0.09
(0.035)*

-0.08
(0.01)*
0.13
(0.024)*
0.014
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.04)
0.90

Model
(2)
-0.0008
(0.02)

0.19
(0.029)*

P risk
TI
GNS
Impor Bs
et S
R2 Ajusted

Model
(3)
0.07
(0.03)*

0.10
(0.03)*
-0.03
(0.031)
-0.004
(0.039)
0.78

-0.012
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.021)
0.02
(0.025)
0.88

-0.02
(0.016)
0.08
(0.03)*
0.003
(0.03)
0.10
(0.05)*
0.72

With (*) to indicate the significance of variables at the 5% level. In parentheses we give the standard
deviations. Source: Developed by the authors.
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The results in Tables 5 and 6 show that the effect of total rent on the equipment
spending is significant in two models, while the impact of the oil rent is significant in
a single model. On the other hand, the impact of total rent on operating expenses is
significant in a single model while the impact of oil rent is not significant.
For the measurement of economic risk and financial risk, their effect is positive
on spending; however, political risk seems to have a positive effect on spending in a
single model.
The effect of investment on equipment spending is positive, gross national saving
(GNS) is negatively correlated with equipment spending as well as operating expenses
in most models, and Import of goods and services seems to have a significant but
negative effect on equipment spending.
Comments of the Results:
The impact of the natural rent is more important than the impact of the oil rent
on the two components of public spending: equipment spending and operational
expenses. Countries rich in natural resources, such as Algeria, are characterized by a
weak rule of law, by a low quality of the legal institutions by a lower participation of
citizens in public decision-making, by political instability, by a high level of corruption
and absence of transparency. Find similar results in the work of Acemoglu et al. 2003;
Mehlum et al. 2006; Isham et al. 2003; Sachs and Warner 1995; Golden and Neary 1982;
Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Arezki and Gylfason 2011; and Beck 2010.
But in the case of Algeria, we find that there is no proportional relationship
between rent and expenditure. This may be due to the part of the oil revenues allocated
to the oil stabilization fund (FRR) supplied by the difference between the tax price and
the price of oil on the world market. This fund was established in 2000 and is intended
to be used to control the budget deficit and smoothing the benefits of long-term
expenses.
For variables indicating the institutional quality, the measure of the economic and
financial risk exercises a positive effect on spending (expenses). It means that
equipment spending and/or operational expenses increase when the economic and
financial risk increases--in particular, the risk of liquidity, the foreign exchange risk,
the operational risk of companies. This effect is low (weak) and could be explained by
the weakness of the economic role of companies in the global economy of the country,
and the almost non-existence of the financial market in Algeria. But, we can add the
effect of the important volatility of the exchange rate dollar/euro, because the Algerian
State denominates (draws up) its imports essentially in euro, which has a negative
impact on public spending (expenses). On the other hand, political risk seems to have
a positive effect on expenditures in a single model. So government expenditure
increases when the risk of conflict, violence and terrorist activity is high (corruption
and lower levels of democracy) (Rabah Arezki et Gylfason, 2011).
Regarding the control variables, the effect of the investment is positive, which
implies that the increase in equipment spending is associated with an increase in
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investments, while the effect of the investment on operational expenses is not
significant. Gross national savings (GNS) is negatively correlated with equipment
spending and with the operational expenses in most models. The model (3) shows a
negative but small significance of the effect of gross national saving (GNS) on
equipment spending.
Finally, and surprisingly, the importation of goods and services seems to have a
significant but negative effect on equipment spending, unlike the effect on operational
expenses which is positive in the mode l(3), for a non-productive country, which needs
to import to satisfy domestic demand for goods and services.
2.4.

2SLS Results and Introduction of the Interaction Term:

In this step, we use the double least square to correct the problem of endogeneity
that can occur in the model.
One possible way of finding the causal effect from institutions on public spending
may in this case be the use of instrumental variable technics. This possibility depends
crucially on the validity of the instruments(s), there are a number of well-known
studies, (such as La Porta et al. (1997), Hall and Jone s(1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson,
Robinson (2001), Siba (2008), Alonso et Garcimartin (2009) , Anne Boschini, Jan
Petterson, Jesper Roine, 2012) that have good instruments for institutions and
successfully used them.
These instruments are clearly obvious candidates in our setting but, we cannot
assume that they will work equally well. Having tried multiple available instruments,
we in the end use air temperature as proxy for the latitude (The absolute distance from
the equator), as do La Porta et. al. (1998), Brunnschweiler (2008), and Siba (2008).
According to Hall and Jones (1999), latitude does not have a direct effect on economic
performance, all the impact transits through an effect on institutional quality.
The latitude captured the difficulties encountered by the countries close to the
equator, notably because of climatic and health conditions in economic development
but also in the construction of good institutions (Landes, 1998). We also used the
lagged variable of economic risk “e_risk (-1)” and of political risk “p_risk (-1)”. As for
the oil rent, we used the instrument price of barrel, also the instrument reserves for the
export of oil.
Moreover, it was interesting to add the interaction term between rent and quality
of the institutions to see the indirect and common effect on the dependent variable.
The interaction effect is regularly used in studies such as; Necklace and Hoeffler, 2007;
Arezki and Gylfason, 2011, Christa N. Brunnschweiler, 2007, Anne Boschini, Jan
Petterson, Jesper Roine, 2013, Acemoglu, et al. (2014) and others.
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The results are presented:
Table 7: Instrumenting for Institutions and Natural Rents; Equipment Expenditure
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Oil_rent
0.27
1.08
(0.0005)*
(0.0052)*
Oil_export
1.92
1.54
(0.0015)*
(0.01)*
E_risk
0.17
2.63
(0.000)*
(0.05)*
F_risk
0.204
(0.01)*
P_risk
0.23
(0.02)*
Oil_rent*e_risk
-0.005
(0.0078)*
Oil_rent*f_risk
Oil_rent*p_risk
Oil_export*e_ris
k
Oil_export*f_ris
k
TI
GNS
Imp Bs et S
C

-0.01
(0.007)*
-0.33
(0.03)*

0.08
(0.0002)*
-0.003
(0.853)
-0.014
(0.7103)
-3.94
(0.000)*

Instruments

R2

82%

-0.24
(0.01)*
0.07
(0.0017)*

-0.02
(0.51)
0.09
(0.0033)*
-13.90
(0.01)*
Prix_barill,
temp

0.067
(0.0043)*
0.01
(0.77)
-0.04
(0.32)
-15.04
(0.0007)*
Oil reserve,
e_risk(-1)

-0.04
(0.17)
-9.28
(0.01)*
Oil reserve,
temp

62%

91%

93%

With (*) to indicate the significance of variables at the 5% level. In parentheses we give the probabilities.

Source: Developed by the authors.
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Table 8: Instrumenting for Institutions and Natural Rents; Operating Expenditures
Variables
Oil_rent

Model 1
0.76
(0.0087)*

Oil_export
E_risk

Model 2

0.65
(0.0042)*
0.30
(0.0024)*

F_risk
P_risk
Oil_rent*e_risk

-0.05
(0.016)*
-0.01
(0.0074)*

Oil_rent*f_risk
Oil_rent*p_risk
Oil_export*e_risk
Oil_export*f_risk
TI

instruments

0.033
(0.28)
-0.041
(0.23)
-0.11
(0.24)
-5.93
(0.04)*
Prix-barill, temp

0.06
(0.09)**
-0.030
(0.35)
0.003
(0.95)
-4.53
(0.010)*
Oil reserve, p_risk(-1)

R2

81%

84%

GNS
Imp Bs et S
C

With (*) to indicate the significance of variables at the 5% level. In parentheses, we give the probabilities.

Source: Developed by the authors.

Interpretation of Results:
The results in Tables 7 and 8 show that the effect of oil rent (or oil export) on
equipment spending or operational expenses is positively significant at 1%. This
means that the response of public expenditure to changes in the rent follows a procyclical dynamic in the case of Algeria, which is not recommended for oil exporting
countries because of the effect of resources to the development of the productive
economy (counterpart), known as the resource curse, find similar results in the work
of Rabah Arezki and Gylfason (2011). Whereas, when revenues are higher than
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expected, the rest goes towards savings rather than spending. While, when revenues
are lower than expected, the government can draw on its financial assets.
Indeed, the pressure of the various social categories for rent sharing (Gylfason
(2001), Iimi (2007), Deacon and Rode (2012) and the considerable propensity of the
state to invest in capital during favorable economic times explains the exceptional level
of public expenditure in Algeria. The same political distortions that are the source of
the large volume of public spending also explain the state's current "preference for
spending". This preference for immediate spending at its postponement prints the
fiscal policy a procyclical dynamics (Bouklia-Hassan, 2014).
In addition to being highly volatile and procyclical, the fiscal policy response to
shocks in oil revenues is asymmetrical. Indeed, current public expenditure is probably
more elastic to the increase in hydrocarbon revenues than to its decrease due to the
irreversibility, to a certain extent, of the increase in current expenditure. In contrast,
equipment spending often finances projects that are likely unproductive "military
designated by the term (white elephants)" or have effects that extend over the medium
to long term and can be deferred (McMahon 1997).
Regarding the variables (Institutional Quality), equipment spending (or
operational expenses) increase following an increase in economic risk and financial
risk, indicates a decrease in compliance with the law, and in the role of legal
institutions in general. This result shows that the government favors non-productive
projects or projects with low yields (infrastructure, subsidies, wages, etc.), to conceal
the errors committed by the authorities with the reason to avoid the conflicts and
discontent of the population. On the other hand, political risk (preventing corruption)
has a positive effect on equipment spending.
However, the interaction effect between rent and institutional quality measures
is negative, indicating that the presence of rent in less democratic countries, like
Algeria, increases expenditures (spending). This indicates that the positive public
spending effects diminish as institutional quality improves. So resource rents lead to
more (less) government spending in less (more) democratic countries (Rabah Arezki
and Gylfason, 2011).
Regarding the control variables, the total investment has a positive impact on
equipment spending, while the latter has no effect on operational expenses. Imports
of goods and services have a positive effect in one model indicating that compared to
non-oil exports, Algeria still is in the excess situation of imports, to satisfy the needs of
the population.
We conclude that the effect of rent and the quality of institutions on operational
expenses is more important than the effect on equipment spending. In a country that
favors inappropriate current and non-productive expenditures, needs to instead invest
to improve the health, education of the population and support productive projects
that stimulate growth.

165

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association
Vol. 20, Issue No. 1, May 2018

3- Conclusion and Extensions
In this study, we try to identify the impact of the natural rent as well as the impact
of institutional quality on the composition of public spending and thus select which of
the two components, operational expenses or equipment spending react better. For
countries rich in oil, gas or minerals, the formulation of fiscal policy can be a delicate
exercise.
We found that the response of public expenditure to changes in the rent follows
a pro-cyclical dynamic in the case of Algeria. Regarding the measure of institutional
quality, we have chosen the most compatible measures with the other variables in the
case of Algeria. We can introduce other measures such as the index of corruption, the
index of governance, quality of bureaucratic...etc but it is more interesting if we use an
approach with panel data, grouping several countries. This will allow us to make a
comparison in terms of public expenditure management.
Indeed, the bad institutional quality shows that the budget procedures lack
transparency with the presence of rent, because the benefits related to the exercise of
power are more important in prompting politicians to manipulate the composition of
public expenditure to maximize their probability to make decisions.
This assumption is argued by the positive relationship between public spending
and the level of financial risk on the one hand and the level of economic risk on the
other. This leaves us to ponder that spending affects the country's financial situation
especially when these expenditures fueling infrastructure or projects with extremely
low rates of return, referred under the term a "white elephant" (McMahon 1997). On
the other side, the positive relationship between public spending and the extent of
political risk shows that the current government increases expenditure to avoid
conflicts and dissatisfaction of the population.
To conclude, budget transparency and good governance based on solid fiscal
institutions should be a priority for developing countries rich in natural resources.
Therefore, the increase in public expenditure requires first determining the destination
and the distribution of investment.
To obtain more reliable results, we are going to proceed to do a study with panel
data concerning countries with a stabilization or investment fund based on
hydrocarbon. We try to show the behavior of each country towards the national
savings and the management of the public spending.
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